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DODGING THE CONSUMER HARM
INQUIRY: A BRIEF SURVEY OF RECENT
GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST CASES
DAVID S. EvANst
INTRODUCTION
The antitrust laws should stop business practices that harm
competition or distort the competitive process. If the courts-or
economists-knew the precise design of the "competitive process"
that maximized consumer welfare, we could simply prohibit
practices that deviate from competitive norms. Unfortunately,
economists do not have a "competitive process bible"-a list of
thou shall nots.
Businesses are always coming up with new ways of
competing. The competitive process in high-technology
industries is vastly different than that in agriculture. The
competitive process in biotechnology is very different than that
in software. The only trustworthy way of finding out whether
business practices harm consumers is to examine their impact on
t Senior Vice President, National Economic Research Associates, Inc. This
paper is based on remarks I made at the Yale Club of New York City, Antitrust
Conference, November 30, 2000. I would like to thank Stephen Bomse, Thomas
Brown, Howard Chang, and William Rooney for helpful discussions, as well as
Kirstyn Walton for research assistance. I have consulted for Microsoft and Visa on
the matters discussed below but the opinions expressed here are mine alone.
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consumers. Have they raised prices, restricted output, or
reduced quality? Or will they?
Theory alone usually cannot answer those questions. The
Supreme Court sent that message loudly and clearly in
California Dental Ass'n v. FTC'-there must be empirical
evidence. 2
The companion papers by Messrs. Houck, Joffe, and Rooney
show widespread agreement that the purpose of the antitrust
laws is to protect consumers. 3 However, the big cases that the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Department of
Justice have actually brought in the last few years present many
excuses for why plaintiffs should not have to come up with hard
evidence that the defendant has harmed consumers-or ever
will.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
There is little dispute that the antitrust laws exist to protect
competition and consumer welfare. Some commentators,
nonetheless, have argued that there is "no requirement of proof
of actual harm to consumers-beyond that of injury to
competition."4 The argument is that "[p]roof of actual consumer
harm is not required because it is inferred from injury to
competition" and because "competition benefits consumers."5
This inference, however, holds true only under limited
circumstances. The Court has ruled that per se offenses, such as
price fixing, are agreements "whose nature and necessary effect
are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish their illegality-they are 'illegal
per se.'"6 Thus, proof of consumer harm is unnecessary since
harm can be presumed under most circumstances.
1 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
2 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999) (holding that a
thorough inquiry into actual consequences of anticompetitive effects is necessary
where the effects are "far from intuitively obvious").
3 See Stephen D. Houck, Injury to Competition/Consumers in High Tech Cases,
75 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 539 (2001); Robert D. Joffe, Antitrust Law and Proof of
Consumer Injury, 75 ST JOHN'S L. REV. 615 (2001); William H. Rooney, Consumer
Injury in Antitrust Litigation: Necessary, but by What Standard?, 75 ST JOHN's L.
REV. 561 (2001).
4 Houck, supra note 3, at 8.
5 Id.
6 Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
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On the other hand, agreements analyzed under the rule of
reason "can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to
the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it
was imposed."7 Thus, because there is no presumption of
consumer harm for rule of reason agreements, plaintiffs must
show consumer harm. And while "naked"8 price and output
restraints analyzed under a "quick look"9 version of the rule of
reason may not require a "detailed market analysis,"10 this is
only appropriate when "an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the
arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect
on customers and markets."11
Although inferences of consumer harm are permitted under
limited circumstances, the Supreme Court has made clear that it
is actual harm to consumers that really matters. This can be
seen in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp.,12 where the Court discussed what was needed to show
consumer harm in a predation case. Predation takes place when
a firm sets low prices to drive competitors out of business, so
that it can then set high prices and recoup its earlier losses. As
the Court found, it is not enough to show that an alleged
predator charged low prices 13 (for that is also the hallmark of
competition, not predation); a plaintiff must also show that the
alleged predator "had a reasonable prospect, or, under section 2
of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of recouping its
investment in below-cost prices."14 The Court was quite clear
that it was not enough to show that competitors were driven out
of business, which the enforcement agencies would likely view as
harm to competition or harm to the competitive process.15 The
7 Id.
8 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759, 769 (1999).
9 Id. at 770.
10 Natl Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984).
11 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.
12 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
13 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222
(1993) ("First, a plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a
rival's low prices must prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate
measure of its rival's costs.").
14 Id. at 224.
15 The Justice Department tried to evade this demanding test in its antitrust
action against American Airlines. United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d
1141 (D. Kan. 2001). It accused American of lowering prices and expanding capacity
20011
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Court explained that a plaintiff must show that there would
ultimately be consumer harm in the form of higher prices:
If circumstances indicate that below-cost pricing could likely
produce its intended effect on the target, there is still the
further question whether it would likely injure competition in
the relevant market. The plaintiff must demonstrate that there
is a likelihood that the predatory scheme alleged would cause a
rise in prices above a competitive level that would be sufficient
to compensate for the amounts expended on the predation,
including the time value of the money invested in it. As we
have observed on a prior occasion, "[uin order to recoup their
losses, [predators] must obtain enough market power to set
higher than competitive prices, and then must sustain those
prices long enough to earn in excess profits what they earlier
gave up in below-cost prices. 16
The recent California Dental decision is also helpful in
understanding the semantic confusion between "harm to
competition" and "harm to consumers." The FTC had argued
that certain advertising restrictions-including restrictions
affecting price advertising-adopted by a dentist association in
in the face of new entry. But it was unable to demonstrate that American set prices
below average variable cost, the measure commonly adopted by courts, or that
American would be able to recoup its alleged loses from these lower prices according
to the district court that dismissed the government's case. The government argued
that American had nevertheless engaged in predation because it made less money
than it could have (that is, sacrificed short-run profits), added capacity to serve the
increased demand, and developed a reputation for predation that deterred entry in
many markets. In dismissing the government's novel predation test, the court
observed:
A rule of predation based on the failure to maximize profits would rob
consumers of the benefits of any price reductions by dominant firms facing
new competition. Such a rule would tend to freeze the prices of dominant
firms at their monopoly levels and would prevent many pro-competitive
price cuts beneficial to consumers and other purchasers.
Id. at 1201 (citing MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1114
(1983)). In rejecting the government's reputation argument, the court noted:
A fundamental principle of antitrust law is that it be capable of effective
and accurate administration, and' not chill the competition it seeks to
foster. The government's reputational liability approach would violate this
principle, permitting claims of predation based solely upon the subjective
and unverifiable complaints of a defendant's competitors.
AMR, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1218.
16 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225-26 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590-591 (1986)). The recent decision in NYI'EX
also makes the point that simply showing injury to a single competitor is
insufficient. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998).
[Vol.75:545
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California were anticompetitive.17 It was so sure of its case that
it did not even have an economist testify that consumers had
been harmed. In some literal sense, it could certainly be argued
that advertising restrictions restrained competition-
competitors certainly faced restrictions on the type of advertising
they could engage in. In the absence of empirical evidence, that
literal argument fails to show that consumers were harmed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the FTC's decision, but it was
overturned by the Supreme Court. The Court rejected the
characterization of the advertising restrictions as naked
restrictions on price and insisted on actual evidence, especially
empirical evidence, of consumer harm:
But these observations brush over the professional context and
describe no anticompetitive effects. Assuming that the record
in fact supports the conclusion that the CDA disclosure rules
essentially bar advertisement of across-the-board discounts, it
does not obviously follow that such a ban would have a net
anticompetitive effect here. Whether advertisements that
announced discounts for, say, first-time customers, would be
less effective at conveying information relevant to competition
if they listed the original and discounted prices for checkups, X-
rays, and fillings, than they would be if they simply specified a
percentage discount across the board, seems to us a question
susceptible to empirical but not a priori analysis.18
[Justice Breyer] thinks that the Commission and the Court of
Appeals "adequately answered that question," ibid, but the
absence of any empirical evidence on this point indicates that
the question was not answered, merely avoided by implicit
burden shifting of the kind accepted by JUSTICE BREYER. The
point is that before a theoretical claim of anticompetitive effects
can justify shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical
evidence of procompetitive effects, as quick-look analysis in
effect requires, there must be some indication that the court
making the decision has properly identified the theoretical
basis for the anticompetitive effects and considered whether the
effects actually are anticompetitive. Where, as here, the
circumstances of the restriction are somewhat complex,
assumption alone will not do.19
On remand, the Ninth Circuit was forced to look at the facts
17 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 762 (1999).
18 Id. at 774 (emphasis added).
19 Id. at 775 n.12 (emphasis added).
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in the record and ruled against the FTC.20 Unfortunately, the
FTC had lost its chance to submit empirical evidence to prove its
case. California Dental may thus help to convince the
enforcement agencies that they should not bring cases unless
they are prepared to prove consumer harm through better
evidence than they have offered in the last few years.21
II. FTC v. INTEL CORP.
Consider the FTC's case against Intel Corporation ("Intel). 22
Intel refused to share its intellectual property with three
companies that had sued it for patent infringement, and the FTC
claimed that this helped Intel maintain a monopoly in chip
making. The FTC said that this suppressed innovation. The
FTC told us:
While [the FTC] must demonstrate that Intel's conduct was
harmful to competition in the sense that it was "reasonably
capable" of making a significant contribution to preserving
Intel's dominance, it is not necessary to demonstrate that Intel's
conduct resulted in increased prices or lower output.23
The FTC used the bolded phrase as an excuse for not
presenting any evidence that Intel's actions had, or ever would,
have significant adverse effects on consumers. It did not have
evidence on whether Intel's actions had reduced the rate of
innovation, lowered prices, restricted output, or could have ever
done so as a factual economic matter. The FTC did not offer any
factual evidence that consumers would benefit from lower prices,
greater output, or more rapid innovation if Intel ceased the
conduct. Instead, the FTC's factual evidence of harm seemed to
be based on the observation that the three companies that were
denied access to advance technical information were
20 See id. at 943 (holding that the FTC failed to prove anticompetitive
restrictions).
21 The Justice Department's case against American Airlines, discussed above in
note 15, was dismissed in part because the government failed to provide any
evidence in support of its monopolization by reputation theory. See United States v.
AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1218 (D. Kan. 2001).
22 See In re Intel Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. 9288 (1999), available at
http'J/www.ftc.gov/osfcaselisttd9288.htm.
23 Compl. Counsel's Pre-Trial Brief, In re Intel Corp., F.T.C. Docket No. 9288
(Feb. 25, 1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/alj/D9288/990225ccpb.pdf (emphasis
added).
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disadvantaged.24  The FTC's case settled shortly after its
economist acknowledged in deposition that there was no direct
evidence at all that Intel's actions had any anticompetitive
effects. 25
HI. UNITED STATES V. VISA U.S.A. INC.
Now consider the Justice Department's case against Visa
U.S.A. Incorporated ("Visa"). 26 (MasterCard is also a defendant,
but I refer only to Visa for simplicity). Visa is a joint venture of
banks. The joint venture manages and nurtures the brand. It
also operates the physical network for processing card
transactions, though it does not set any prices. The banks
compete for individuals to take cards and merchants to accept
them.27 Now, American Express wanted Visa banks to issue
American Express cards as well as Visa cards. Note the phrase
"as well as," not "instead of." American Express only wanted a
bank if it also belonged to the Visa system. Visa told its
members they could not belong to Visa if they issued American
Express cards. The Justice Department claimed this was an
antitrust violation.28
This claim would appear to be susceptible to proof by direct
evidence. If Visa let American Express into the tent, would that
result in a significant net increase in the number of cards and
would that lead to lower prices to cardholders? That is the kind
of question that economists can really sink their teeth into. The
following type of language should be a clear signal that the
plaintiff wants to duck the consumer harm inquiry:
To show consumer harm, it is not necessary to prove precisely
what choices consumers would have made, precisely how
24 Id.
2 David Segal, Intel, U.S. Set Strategies for Antitrust Trial; Firm to Emphasize
Concession by Government Expert Witness, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at El.
26 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., No. 98-07076, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10212 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1999).
27 See generally DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH
PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 65-69, 197-200
(1999).
28 The Justice Department also objected to "duality"-the fact that banks could
belong to both Visa and MasterCard associations. Duality resulted from the Justice
Department's failure in the mid-1970s to agree to Visas pleas to prevent it. See
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 27, at 267-75. The associations, Visa in
particular, have come close to ending duality as a practical matter. The Justice
Department wanted to prevent them from ever going back.
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individual firms would have tried to respond to consumers, or
whether they would have won or lost the competitive battle; it
is sufficient to prove that the challenged restraint had a
significant impact on the process by which competitive decisions
were made.29
And sure enough, in 227 pages of written testimony, the
Justice Department's economist never addressed the basic issue
of whether consumers would get significantly more cards or
lower prices.30 For example, the following discussion transpired
during the direct testimony of Michael Katz.
Q. Now, turning to another point, I looked through your direct
testimony, Professor Katz, and I didn't find any attempt by you
to quantify the number of cards that you would expect to be
issued in the event that the rules were to be eliminated. Am I
correct that -
A. Yes, there is no attempt by me to make a prediction about
the number of cards, that's correct.
Q. Let me ask you, have you measured in an empirical way any
price increases in this case?
A. In terms of the narrow conception of pricing, how a price
change has gone from a particular number of dollars and cents
to another, no.31
In fact, Katz did not come up with any qualitative estimates
of the extent to which prices or output would change and had no
factual basis for opining about consumer harm. The government
made other statements that have come to characterize this genre
of antitrust claims, such as antitrust is really about preserving
"consumer choice" and preserving the "competitive process."32
But when agencies immediately disavow the need to present
evidence of consumer harm after repeating those phrases, they
are substituting slogans for analysis.33
29 Pls.' Post-Trial Proposed Conclusions of Law 9L 10 (No. 98-7076) (Sept. 22,
2000), Visa U.S.A., Inc., 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 72, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
30 Direct Testimony of Michael Katz (No. 98-7076) (June 16, 2000), Visa U.S-A-,
Inc.,. Trade Cas. (CCH) % 72, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
31 Trial Testimony of Michael Katz at 3728 (No. 98-7076) (July 12, 2000), Visa
U.S.A., Inc.,. Trade Cas. (CCH) 72, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
32 Pls.' Post-Trial Proposed Conclusions of Law 8-15 (No. 98-7076) (Sept. 22,
2000), Visa U.S.A., Inc.,. Trade Cas. (CCH) 72, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
33 The court adopted the rule of reason, stating that "[u]nder the rule of reason,
the Government bears the initial burden (by preponderance of the evidence) of
demonstrating that each restraint has substantial adverse effects on compensation
[Vol.75:545
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IV. UNITED STATES V. MICROSOFT CORP.
Now let us take a look at United States v. Microsoft Corp.34
Microsoft Corporation ("Microsoft") integrated browsing software
into its operating system. The government (here the Justice
Department and the nineteen state co-plaintiffs) said that tying
was illegal. Microsoft invested hundreds of millions of dollars
into making a high-quality browser. It then invested even more
in order to make it the standard by giving it away for free. The
government said that was predation and Judge Jackson
concurred.35 But I do not want to debate the merits of the
government's case. Rather, I focus on how the Justice
Department attempted to show consumer harm. Professor
Frank Fisher had the major responsibility for presenting the
government's economic case. According to him, "The
presumption of antitrust policy is that competition itself brings
consumer benefits, and the lessening of competition brings
consumer harm. Hence, plaintiffs are required to show an injury
to competition rather than immediate harm to consumers."36
This line of reasoning became an excuse for substituting
rhetoric for hard evidence during the trial. For example,
Professor Fisher offered this opinion:
You know, Jacques Brel says that they want to color the World
the color of goose shit. If Microsoft forced upon the world one
browser, that would make it really simple. That's not what
competition is about. That's not what helping consumers is
about. Giving choice is what competition is about.3 7
Professor Fisher acknowledged that Microsoft had not
harmed consumers up to the time of trial.
such as increase in price or decrease in quality." United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.
163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 345 (2001). The court, however, found Visa's restrictions on
issuance of American Express cards by Visa members to be anticompetitive even
though the government and its expert had not presented evidence demonstrating
"substantiality." Id.
m See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000),
vacated by, remanded by, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 350
(2001).
35 See Conclusions of Law at 20-21 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233), Microsoft, 97 F.
Supp. 2d 59.
36 Franklin M. Fisher & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Misconceptions, Misdirection, and
Mistakes, in DID MICROSOFT HARM CONSUMERS: TWO OPPOSING VIEWS 88 (2000)
(emphasis added).
37 Trial Testimony of Franklin M. Fisher at 27-28 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233)
(January 7, 1999, A.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
2oo1
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Q. At the present time, have-in your analysis--consumers
been hurt by Microsoft's conduct?
A. On balance?
Q. Yes.
A. That's very hard to know. The reason that it's mostly
hard-on balance, I would think the answer was no, up to this
point. The reason for that is that Microsoft has used its power
to protect its operating system's monopoly from a threat that
might not have materialized by this time anyway. And, in
doing that, it has given away a lot of things.38
He has since pointed out that in predation cases harm comes
in the future. True enough. But we have known since Brooke
Group that that does not give the plaintiff a license to assume
consumer harm. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
predator could plausibly expect to recoup its losses. That would
have required the Justice Department to look at the likely state
of competition in the market for operating systems in the future.
It also would have required them to look into whether Netscape
could have plausibly succeeded in the absence of Microsoft's
actions. Because such inquiries were never conducted, Judge
Jackson did not have much of a factual basis for concluding that
Microsoft's actions-on balance--caused consumer harm in the
past, present, or future. A careful reading of his Findings of Fact
demonstrates the trouble he had doing so. The following table
summarizes Judge Jackson's perceived consumer benefits and
harms:
38 Trial Testimony of Franklin M. Fisher at 29-30 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233)
(January 12, 1999, A.M. Session), Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
[Vol.75:545
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Table 1: Consumer Benefits and Harms Identified by Judge Jackson
Consumer Benefits
Consumers who used browsers and would
have paid for them benefited from lower
prices for browsing software. (FOF 408)
These benefits were as much as $79 for
some consumers.
Consumers who used browsers benefited
from higher quality of browsing software.
(FOF 408)
Consumers who used browsers benefited
from greater availability of browsing
software. (FOF 408)
Compaq paid lower prices because of its
"support of Microsoft's Internet strategy."
To the extent that the plaintiff's allegation
is taken as true that reductions in price are
passed through to end users, Compaq
purchasers benefited. (FOF 232 -235)
Source: Findings of Fact,
referred to as FOF].
Consumer Harms
Consumers who did not want any browser
were harmed because Windows 98 came
with an integrated browser. (FOF 410)
Consumers who wanted Navigator were
harmed because Microsoft made it more
difficult to acquire a copy of Navigator.
(FOF 9410)
Consumers who preferred IE may still
have been harmed from a greater
likelihood of browser crashes "to the
extent that browsing-specific routines
been commingled with operating system
routines to a greater degree than is
necessary to provide any consumer
benefit." (FOF T 174)
Consumers who wanted more Java
applications were harmed because there
were fewer Java applications as a result of
Microsoft's actions. (FOF T 411)
Consumers who would have benefited
from the video and graphics features
included in Intel's NSP and who did not
get them were harmed. (FOF 410)
IBM and Gateway were harmed because
they paid relatively higher prices as a
result of their "reluctance" to help
Microsoft "capture browser share." To the
extent that the plaintiff is correct that
higher prices are passed through to end
consumers, IBM and Gateway consumers
were harmed. (FOF 9 235 -238)
U.S. v. Microsoft (No. 98-1232) (November 5, 1999) [here
Judge Jackson recognized that Microsoft's actions delivered
great benefits to consumers by lowering browser prices,
improving browser quality, and expanding browser output.39 He
then identified discrete groups of consumers that were harmed.40
These are mainly consumers who did not want a browser and got
stuck with a wad of unwanted Internet Explorer code on their
39 See Findings of Fact at %[ 186, 408 (Nos. 98-1232; 98-1233) (Nov. 5, 1999),
Microsoft, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59.
40 See id. 410.
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machines. There could not have been many of those consumers,
so Judge Jackson does not have any basis for concluding that
consumers were harmed on balance-he was not given testimony
that would enable him to do that. One might think he could
have gotten himself out of this hole by finding that consumers
could have benefited from lower prices or greater output in the
future, yet he recognized that there was no basis for concluding
that any of the competitive threats to Microsoft would have
materialized.41
In the end, Judge Jackson substituted rhetoric for direct
evidence of consumer harm. He found that Microsoft had denied
"consumer[s] choice," "distort[ed] competition," and "stifl[ed]
innovation."42 These are the catch phrases that we see whenever
a plaintiff lacks direct evidence that consumers, overall, have
been injured.
V. THE INNOVATION GAMBIT
The enforcement agencies also used another dodge to avoid
the presentation of direct evidence of consumer harm: the claim
that the challenged practices harm innovation. The agencies
then hide behind the difficulty of proving harm to innovation.
The Justice Department's case against Visa highlights the
problem. The Department had an enormous record that it
scoured for evidence of suppressed innovation. It turns out that
American Express had entered into a lot of deals with banks
outside of the U.S. Furthermore, another practice that the
government was challenging-something known as duality-had
been in place for decades.
The Justice Department, however, came up with little
evidence of suppressed competition that they were willing to
41 Judge Jackson noted, "There is insufficient evidence to find that, absent
MVicrosoft's actions, Navigator and Java already would have ignited genuine
competition in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems." Id. 411.
42 Id. 411-12. The D.C. Circuit concluded that most of the antitrust
violations found by Judge Jackson did not "withstand appellate scrutiny." United
States v. Microsoft Corp. 253 F.3d 34, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2001) cert. denied, 122 S.Ct.
350 (2001). The D.C. Circuit also vacated the remedies ordered by Judge Jackson in
their entirety and remanded them to the district court "to determine the propriety of
a specific remedy for the limited ground of liability which we have upheld." Id. at
107. The D.C. Circuit did affirm some of Judge Jackson's monopoly maintenance
findings, without subjecting those findings to a serious consideration of whether the
allegedly anticompetitive actions resulted in substantial harm to customers.
[Vol.75:545
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offer. Instead, when Janet Reno announced the case, she merely
stated that consumers would have had smart cards years ago if
Visa and MasterCard had not suppressed innovation:
America's consumers have lost out. They have lost the benefit
of vigorous competition between the two largest credit card
networks, which means that they have not enjoyed the
innovation that competition brings. For example, smart
cards-cards that use a computer chip that will expand the
ways consumers can make purchases-have been delayed for
about a decade. 43
The thinking seemed to be that if the French had smart
cards, so should Americans. It turns out that the French cards
are not all that smart, and they made sense there mainly
because the French telephone system was so slow and
expensive.4
To counter the paucity of evidence, the government's
economic expert asserted that "it is important to recognize that
record evidence of direct restraints on competition is likely to be
only the tip of the iceberg."45 Of course this expert had no
empirical basis for knowing whether he was looking at the tip of
the giant iceberg or all of a little iceberg.46
CONCLUSION
There are several principles that should be addressed when
considering consumer harm. First, we should be interested in
long-run consumer welfare, so the courts should consider
43 Press Release, Department of Justice, Prepared Remarks of Attorney
General Janet Reno on DOJ Case Against Visa and MasterCard (Oct. 7, 1998),
available at http:/www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/1998/October/466at.htm.
"See Kenneth Cline, The Smart Card Disconnection, BANKING STRATEGIES,
MarJApr. 1998, at 64-71; Paul Demery, An Easy Fix for Fraud?, CREDIT CARD
MGMT., May 1998, at 72-76; Alan S. Horowitz, Smart Cards Not Yet Welcome-New
Features Promises Tests Fail to Produce Widespread U.S. Acceptance, INFORMATION
WEEK, Mar. 2, 1998, at 106; Holly Sraeel, Get Smart: MasterCard Jumps on the
Chip Card Bandwagon, BANK SYSTEMS & TECH., Sept. 1994, at 40.
45 Trial Testimony of Michael Katz at 4053 (No. 98-7076) (Sept. 22, 2000),
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 72, 584 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
46 The court found against the government on the duality count. In particular,
it rejected the innovation arguments of the government and its economic expert,
noting that "[p]laintiff, through its expert Prof. Katz, has posited a theory as to how
dual governance might create disincentives for some forms of competition between
the associations, but has failed to offer credible evidence to support that theory."
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. 163 F. Supp. 2d 322,378 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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consumer harm in the future as well as in the past. Future
consumer harm, however, is naturally more speculative than
past consumer harm and should get less weight.
Second, we should be interested in overall consumer welfare.
Therefore, if actions result in benefits and costs to consumers,
both need to be weighed. It is not enough to show that some
consumers are worse off-that is always true in competitive
markets.
Third, we should recognize, with regard to proof
requirements, that one size does not fit all. The kind of evidence
that will be necessary to prove consumer harm will vary from
case to case. Ultimately, the plaintiff should be required to
prove that the actions at issue probably cause a reduction in
consumer welfare through higher prices, lower output or lower
quality. On the one hand, it is not enough to just claim that the
action harms the competitive process even if that is supported by
a Nobel Prize winning economist who has divined what the
competitive process should be. On the other hand, it is not
always necessary to conduct full-blown econometric studies of
price and output effects to reach a reasoned conclusion.
Fourth, the courts should presume that markets work best
when left to their own devices. If the court is to substitute its
judgment for that of the market, it should bear the burden of
proving that consumers would be better off. By placing
competition policy in the hands of the courts rather than a
regulatory authority, as a nation we have decided to give all
business practices the benefit of the doubt. The great
experiments conducted last century in having governments
regulate or run some markets confirm how sensible this decision
was.
Lastly, the courts themselves have a dismal record of
substituting their judgment for the market. If we were to stack
up all the writings the courts have made over the last century,
those writings on how the courts have condemned business
practices that help consumers would be far higher than the stack
of those on how the courts have exonerated business practices
that really do harm consumers. For example, anyone familiar
with either the Chicago literature or the post-Chicago literature
knows that there is no theoretical or empirical basis for a per se
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rule against tying.47 Moreover there is no economic basis for
believing that the application of the test described in the
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde48 decision will
distinguish procompetitive from anticompetitive tying.49 The
test cannot distinguish such tying because it does not consider
overall consumer welfare.
47 See KEITH N. HYLTON & MICHAEL SALINGER, TYING LAW AND POLICY: A
DECISION THEORETIC APPROACH (B.U. School of Law, Working Paper Series, Law
and Economics, Working Paper No. 01-04, 2001), available at
http//www.bu.edu/law/faculty/papers/pdLfiles/HyltonK41901.pdf.
48 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
49 See id. at 9-18.
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